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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) provides this court with appellate jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court erred in reconsidering its prior decision denying 
Mrs. Fields Cookies ("MFC") summary judgment on Joe Trembly's ("Trembly") claim for 
breach of an implied "for-cause" employment contract? 
Questions of whether a trial court complied with the rules of civil procedure are 
questions of law. See Avila v. Winn. 794 P.2d 20, 22 (Utah 1990). This court accords "no 
particular deference to the determinations of law made by the trial court but review[s] them 
for correctness." Id. 
2. Whether the trial court erred in granting MFC summary judgment on 
Trembly's claim for breach of an implied "for-cause" employment contract? 
Summary Judgment is proper when "there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R.Civ.P. 
56(c). "[W]hen reviewing an order granting summary judgment, the evidence and all 
inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence must be liberally construed in 
favor of the party opposing the motion." Johnson v. Morton Thiokol. Inc.. 818 P.2d 997, 
1000 (Utah 1991). "However, if the evidence presented is such that no reasonable jury could 
conclude that the parties agreed to limit the employer's right to terminate the employee, it is 
appropriate for a court to decide the issue as a matter of law." Id. at 1001. "As a question 
of law, this decision is reviewed for correctness." Evans v. GTE Health Systems Inc.. 857 
P.2d 974, 976 (Utah App. 1993). 
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DETERMINATIVE RULES 
A determination of the issues presented requires an analysis of Utah R.Civ.P. 
54(b), 56, 60(b) and 61. Pursuant to Utah R.App.P. 24(a)(6) and (f), MFC has reproduced 
these rules at tab "A" of the attached Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action grows out of Trembly's discharge from employment with MFC. In a 
five-count complaint, filed August 22, 1990, Trembly alleged that MFC (1) breached an 
implied-in-fact employment contract to terminate him only "for cause", (2) breached a 
written contract to terminate him only in accordance with "express written company policies 
and procedures," (3) breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (4) committed 
fraudulent misrepresentation and (5) committed intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
R. at 1-5. 
On December 17, 1990, MFC moved to dismiss Trembly's claim for breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. R. at 38-39. The trial court granted MFC's motion by order dated April 10, 1991. 
R. at 96-97. 
Shortly thereafter, MFC moved for summary judgment on the four remaining 
claims. R. at 119-20. The trial court originally granted MFC summary judgment on the tort 
claims and denied MFC summary judgment on the contract claims. R. at 317 & 320. Upon 
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reconsideration, however, the trial court granted MFC summary judgment on the breach of 
written contract claim. R. at 321-22, 360 & 374-75.* 
Nearly a year later, the Utah Supreme Court handed down its decisions in 
Sanderson v. First Security Leasing. 844 P.2d 303 (Utah 1992), and Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah. 
Inc.. 844 P.2d 331 (Utah 1992). Based upon these decisions, as well as a memorandum 
decision filed by the trial court in Power v. Riverview Financial Corp.. Case No. 10741, 
MFC requested relief from the trial court's prior order denying it summary judgment on the 
implied "for-cause" employment contract claim. R. at 657-658. The trial court granted 
MFC's motion and, on May 25, 1993, entered a formal order awarding MFC summary 
judgment on that claim (tab "B"). R. at 781 & 858-59. 
On June 24, 1993, Trembly filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's May 25th 
order (tab "C"). R. at 862. Trembly has not appealed the dismissal of his claim for breach 
of a written contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, misrepresentation 
or intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. MFC employed Trembly, for an indefinite term, in a staff and managerial 
capacity from November 26, 1986, to March 13, 1990. R. at 2, 125 & 142-44. 
*MFC also filed a motion in limine to preclude Trembly "from introducing into evidence 
statements relating to a corporate outlook of 'fairness'" or MFC's "nonbinding disciplinary 
policy." R. at 435. MFC, however, never submitted the motion for decision. 
Consequently, the trial court did not rule on it and, contrary to Trembly's representation, did 
not deny the motion finding " Trembly's evidence of an implied-in-fact contract sufficient to 
require jury considerations." Brief of Appellant at 4. 
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2. On November 13, 1986, Trembly completed and signed an Application for 
Employment with MFC (tab "D"). The beginning of the application provides in relevant 
part: 
All employees of the Company are "at-will" employees subject to 
termination at anytime with or without cause. 
And immediately above Trembly's signature, the application reads: 
Further, I understand and agree that my employment is for no definite 
period and may, regardless of the date of payment of my wages and salary, 
be terminated without any previous notice. 
R. at 125, 148 & 172-73. 
3. The MFC Policy and Procedures Manual in place during Trembly's 
employment is filled with plain language declaring that employment with MFC is at will: 
In addition, the Company reserves the right to terminate any employee at 
will. 
* * * 
At THE COMPANY all employees are "at-will" employees subject to 
termination at any time with or without cause. 
* * * 
GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE TERMINATION 
As noted, THE COMPANY reserves the right to terminate immediately. 
The following are violations that are Grounds for Immediate Termination: 
* * * 
The above list is not all inclusive. It bv no means covers all violations that 
could occur during employment, and THE COMPANY reserves the right to 
terminate at will. 
R. at 127, 186-90 & 196. 
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4. The MFC Employee Handbook, which went into effect in November 1989 
and which Trembly used to train a store manager, repeatedly proclaims in the simplest of 
terms that all employment with MFC is at will: 
This handbook is provided as a guide which you may use to familiarize 
yourself with The Company. It is provided and is intended only as a 
helpful guide. It does not constitute, nor should it be construed to 
constitute an agreement or contract of employment, express or implied, or 
as a promise of treatment in any particular manner in any given situation. 
This handbook states only general Company guidelines. The Company 
may, at any time,in its sole discretion, modify or vary from anything stated 
in this handbook. 
This handbook supersedes all prior handbooks, manuals, policies and 
procedures issued by the Company. 
* * * 
The Company is an "at-will" employer which means that any and all team 
members are subject to termination at anytime with or without cause. 
Although we generally will follow a disciplinary process because we are an 
at-will employer, The Company reserves the right to terminate a team 
member immediately 
* * * 
As stated earlier, The Company is an "at-will" employer. 
* * * 
II. Termination of Employment 
Every employee is free to terminate his or her employment at any time, 
with or without cause. 
* * * 
Likewise, The Company is free to terminate an employee's employment at 
any time with or without cause. 
* * * 
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As stated earlier, the Company is an "at will" employer. Therefore the 
above list is not all-inclusive. The Company will deal with each case 
individually, and this information should not be construed as a promise of a 
specific treatment in a given situation. 
These are some of the grounds for immediate termination. Of course, this 
list by no means covers all violations that could occur during 
employnunt,and Mrs. Fields reserves the right to terminate at will. 
R. at 126-27, 145-50, 170 & 178-84. 
5. Trembly understood from the day he began working for MFC to the day he 
was discharged that he was an at-will employee: 
Q. You understood from the day you were employed until the day you 
were terminated that you were an employee at-will, did you not? 
A. I understood that it was at-will, but understood that I would be 
treated fairly. 
R. at 126 & 147. Indeed, even following his discharge, Trembly acknowledged that he 
understood employment with MFC was at will: 
I do understand that Mrs. Fields is an at-will Company but I do believe that 
my termination should be removed from the at-will reference because I 
believe I was fired without good reason. 
R. at 126 & 175. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This court must affirm the trial court in all respects. First, Timm v. Dewsnup. 
851 P.2d 1178 (Utah 1993), makes it clear that the trial court acted correctly when it 
reconsidered its previous decision denying MFC summary judgment on Trembly's implied-
in-fact contract claim. Second, because no reasonable jury could have found that Trembly 
had overcome the presumption of at-will employment, the trial court also acted correctly 
when it granted MFC summary judgment on that claim. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court's Reconsideration of its Prior Decision Denying MFC 
Summary Judgment on Trembly's Claim for Breach of an Implied "For-
Cause" Employment Contract Was Entirely Appropriate, 
Trembly argues that MFC relied upon Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b)(7) in bringing its 
Motion for Relief from Order, that rule 60(b)(7) requires that "MFC must show that the 
reasons it gave for relief . . . were extraordinary, and that "[t]here was nothing extraordinary 
for . . . [the trial court] to consider." Brief of Appellant at 14-15. Trembly's analysis of 
this issue is wrong. 
"Any judge is free to change his or her mind on the outcome of a case until a 
decision is formally rendered." Bennion v. Hansen. 699 P.2d 757, 760 (Utah 1985). Timm. 
851 P.2d 1178, is directly on-point. There, defendant, Althea Dewsnup, appealed the trial 
court's denial of several motions including one to reconsider a summary judgment. Id. at 
1179. "The trial court denied Mrs. Dewsnup's motion to reconsider the summary judgment, 
stating that 'no such motion exists under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.'" Id. at 1184. 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed and ordered "the trial court to address the motion on its 
merits" holding "that pursuant to the provisions of rule 54(b), because the summary judgment 
was 'subject to revision,'2 a motion to reconsider is a reasonable means of requesting such a 
revision and is therefore permitted." Id. at 1185. See also Kennedy v. New Era Indus.. 
Inc.. 600 P.2d 534, 536-37 (Utah 1979); Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors. 761 
P.2d 42, 44-45 (Utah App. 1988). 
2
 A summary "judgment is 'subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment 
adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties'" unless certified as 
a final judgment. Timm. 851 P.2d at 1184 (quoting Utah R.Civ.P. 54(b)). 
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Here, as in Timm, MFC asked the trial court to reconsider its disposition of a 
summary judgment that was "subject to revision."3 The trial court granted MFC's request; 
the trial court would have erred if it had not done so. There it stands. 
Alternatively, even if the trial court did err in reconsidering the summary 
judgment, a remand for this reason would be inappropriate under the harmless error 
standard. Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is controlling; it provides in 
pertinent part: 
[N]o error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted 
by the court or by any of the parties, is ground for . . . disturbing a 
judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court 
inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the 
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does 
not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
An error substantially affects the rights of a party when "there is reasonable likelihood that in 
its absence there would have been a different result." Joseph v. W.H. Groves Latter-Day 
Saints Hospital. 348 P.2d 935 (Utah 1960). In light of the trial court's ruling that, as a 
matter of law, Trembly could not make out a claim for breach of an implied "for-cause" 
employment contract, there was no such error here for the result—dismissal of Trembly's 
claim—would have been the same except that all of the parties would have unnecessarily 
spent thousands of additional dollars in litigation costs. 
3That MFC's request for reconsideration was styled Defendant's Motion for Relief from 
Order and originally brought pursuant to rule 60(b) is of no consequence. First, the motion 
was properly brought under that rule. See Rees v. Albertson's. Inc., 587 P.2d 130, 131-32 
(Utah 1978) (use of 60(b) as a mechanism for reconsidering denial of summary judgment 
upheld). Second, regardless, both Trembly and the trial court treated MFC's motion as one 
for reconsideration. R. at 853-56 & 873-76. 
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II. The Trial Court Properly Granted MFC Summary Judgment on Trembly's 
Claim for Breach of an Implied "For-Cause" Employment Contract. 
Trembly next argues that he introduced sufficient "evidence of MFC's intent and 
Trembly's reasonable expectation of 'for cause' contract terms' to avoid summary 
judgment.4 Brief of Appellant at 19 Trembly's position is without merit.5 
A. Trembly Is Bound by the Provisions in the MFC Employment 
Application and Handbooks Stating that Employment is Terminable At 
Will. 
Utah law presumes that employment for "no specified term of duration" is at will. 
Berube v. Fashion Centre. Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033, 1044 (Utah 1989) (Durham, J., joined by 
Stewart, J.); see also id. at 1051 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result). An employee 
may overcome this presumption by proving lite existence of an implied agreement with his or 
her employer to terminate the employment relationship only "for cause". Id. at 1044 & 
1051. ""!l n implied agreement to termii late "for cause", howe\ ei , cannot contradict ai i express 
4Trembly, in the opening of his brief, phrases the issue at hand in terms of whether he 
had an implied-in-fact employment contract "whereby he could only be terminated after 
disciplinary counseling and an opportunity to correct deficiencies." Brief of Appellant at 2. 
That is an incorrect statement of the issue. A correct statement is: Whether Trembly had an 
implied-in-fact employment contract whereby he could only be terminated "for cause"? To 
this end, MFC notes (1) that Trembly's claim in his complaint for breach of an implied 
employment contract centers on whether "he was a 'for cause' employee;" (2) that Trembly 
is only appealing the trial court's decision granting MFC summary judgment on his implied 
"for-cause" employment contract claim; (3) that Trembly's docketing statement defines the 
issue presented on appeal in terms of the "for-cause" standard (tab "E") and (4) that the 
substantive argument in Trembly's brief addresses itself to the "for-cause" standard. R. at 2, 
858-59 & 862; Brief of Appellant at 19. 
5Trembly also argues that because "no one at MFC ever claimed that Trembly was 
terminated for anything other than cause," MFC may not now "claim absolution" under the 
at-will presumption. Brief of Appellant at 20-21. Trembly's position is absurd; by definition 
an at-will employer, like MFC, has the right to terminate employment at any time, for any 
reason or for no reason at all. 
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contractual provision providing for employment at will. See Johnson, 818 P.2d at 1004 
(citing Brehanv v. Nordstrom, Inc.. 812 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah 1991)); Berube, 771 P.2d at 
1044. 
Here, Trembly and MFC expressly memorialized in the Application for 
Employment Trembly signed when he applied for work with MFC their understanding that 
Trembly's employment with MFC was at will. Trembly's application reads: 
All employees of the Company are "at-will" employees subject to 
termination at anytime with or without cause. 
* * * 
Further, I understand and agree that my employment is for no definite 
period and may, regardless of the date of payment of my wages and salary, 
be terminated without any previous notice. 
Fact t 2.6 MFC also unequivocally disclaimed in its Policy and Procedures Manual and 
Employee Handbook any intent to fetter its right to discharge employees at will. See Fact ft 
2-3. 
Because the law bars the consideration of implied contractual terms that are 
inconsistent with express contractual terms where, as here, the express terms are laid out in a 
signed employment application or in clear and conspicuous disclaimers, the trial court 
properly entered summary judgment. See Hodgson. 844 P.2d at 334 ("when an employee 
handbook contains a clear and conspicuous disclaimer of contractual liability, any other 
6In his brief, Trembly informs this court that at the time he was hired Mitchell Dorin, 
another MFC employee, made certain statements regarding the MFC disciplinary process. 
Brief of Appellant at 6 & 20. Trembly, however, testified that he was hired by Nabil Dijani 
and that his alleged conversation with Mr. Dorin did not occur until February-March 1987. 
R. at 142; Trembly deposition (tab "F") at 153. Additionally, Trembly has acknowledged 
that he was hired as an at-will employee. Brief of Appellant at 17. 
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agreement * disclaimer"); Basich v. target Stores, 
Inc., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16336, *7 (Or. 1992) (disclaimer prevented "as a matter of 
law, the formation of an implied contract"); Bvkonen v. United Hospital, 179 N.W .2d 140, 
142 (N.D. 1992) ("presence of a clear and conspicuous disclaimer in the employee 
handbook" preserved the presumption of at-will employment); Johnson, 818 P.2d at 1003 
("We also note that a number of jurisdictions have held that a clear and conspicuous 
disclaimer, as a matter of law, prevents employee manuals or other like material from being 
considered as implied in-fact contract terms"); Grimes v. Allied Stores Corp., 768 P 2d 528, 
528-29 (Wash. App. 1989) (employee's "specific agreement in her application preempt[ed] 
the arguably inconsistent policy manual"); Reid v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 453, 
460-62 (6th Cir. 1986) (at-will provision in employment application constituted express 
contract barring any contrary implied contract). 
B. Trembly Had No More than a Mere Subjective Expectancy that He 
Would Be Terminated Only "For Cause". 
Even if Trembly had not agreed to an express term of employment at ill l\II;C 
would still be entitled to summary judgment for two independent reasons. First, no 
reasonable jury could conclude that Trembly and MFC ever settled upon an implied "for-
cause" agreement restricting the company's right to discharge Trembly. 
In order for an implied "for-cause" term to exist, "it must meet the requirements 
for an offer of a i n: lilateral contract." Johnson, 818 P 2d at 1002 Accordingly, thei e must 
be an objective "manifestation of the employer's intent that is communicated to the employee 
and sufficiently definite to operate as a contract provision. I iii theim lianifestation 
. . . must be of such a nature that the employee can reasonably believe that the employer is 
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making an offer of employment other than employment at will." Id. A subjective 
expectation of "for-cause" employment does not create an enforceable contractual obligation. 
See Duncan v. Rolm-Spec Computers. 917 F.2d 261, 265 (6th Cir. 1990) (quoting Sepanske 
v. BendixCorp.. 384 N.W.2d 54, 58 (Mich App. 1985)). 
The facts of this case do not raise a triable issue as to the existence of an implied 
"for-cause" employment contract. (A) Trembly's employment application distinctly states in 
two separate places that the employment is at will and that an employee may be terminated at 
any time with or without notice. See Fact H 2. (B) MFC's Policy and Procedures Manual 
affirms the at-will nature of employment with MFC. For example, the Policy and 
Procedures Manual provides: 
In addition, the Company reserves the right to terminate any employee at 
will. 
* * * 
At THE COMPANY all employees are "at-will" employees subject to 
termination at any time with or without cause. 
Fact if 3. (C) MFC's Employee Handbook insists upon the employee's at-will status in even 
greater detail. It provides, by way of example, that: 
The Company is an "at-will" employer which means that any and all team 
members are subject to termination at anytime with or without cause. 
Although we generally will follow a disciplinary process because we are an 
at-will employer, The Company reserves the right to terminate a team 
member immediately. 
* * * 
Every employee is free to terminate his or her employment at any time, 
with or without cause. 
* * * 
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Likewise, The Company is free to • nloyee's einployiiu.Mil at 
any time with or without cause. 
Fact 1 4.7 (D) Following his termination, Trembly acknowledged in his communications 
with MFC that his employment was ;ii will: 
I do understand that Mrs. Fields is an at-will Company but I do believe that 
my termination should be removed from the at-will reference because I 
believe I was fired without good reason. 
Fact 15. (E) Trembly, in his deposition, reaffirmed that he understood that he was an at-
will employee: 
Q. You understood from the day you were employed until the day you 
were terminated that you were an employee at-will, did you not? 
A. I understood til: lat it was at-will, bi it i inderstood that I w ould be 
treated fairly. 
Id. (F) Trembly also admitted in his deposition that he understood that "everything that you 
could possibly do except for combing your hair" was an immediately terminable nffemt.' R. 
at 150.8 
Notwithstanding the explicit statements in the Policy and Procedures Manual and the 
Employee Handbook to the contrary, Trembly asks this court to indelibly cast the 
disciplinary policy as an inviolate procedure and to ignore the plain language that delineates 
the policy as only a guideline that is not to be construed as a contract of employment, 
promise of specific treatment, or limitation on MFC's right to discharge at will. See Fact t1 
3-4. 
8Trembly has taken some liberties with the record in an attempt to escape the fact that, at 
most, he only had a subjective expectancy of "for-cause" employment. By way of example, 
Trembly claims that Daniel Murphy, an MFC manager, testified that the company's "at-will 
policy was limited by the terms that no employee be terminated arbitrarily and capriciously, 
nor without reason." Brief of Appellant at 9. Mr. Murphy actually testified that MFC was 
an at-will employer, with the power to terminate with or without cause, that did not act 
arbitrarily and capriciously. R. at 282; Murphy deposition (tab "G") at 87, 93 & 95. By 
way of further example, Trembly alleges that the testimony of Craig Atnip, another MFC 
(continued...) 
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No reasonable jury faced with these facts could conclude that Trembly reasonably 
believed that MFC had offered him an implied-in-fact employment contract to be discharged 
only "for cause". Consequently, summary judgment was appropriate. See Hodgson, 844 
P.2d at 332-34 (despite statement by employer's manager to employee during preemployment 
interview that employer "followed disciplinary procedures to give employees a chance to 
correct deficiencies," employee "could not have reasonably concluded that employment was 
other than at will" given disclaimers and fact that employee signed a "'New Employee 
Checklist' which stated that employment was at will"); Johnson. 997 P.2d at 1003 ("the only 
reasonable conclusion an employee or a juror could reach" given handbook's disclaimer is 
that employer "intended to retain the right to discharge for any reason"); Duncan, 917 F.2d 
263-65 (in light of signed employment application specifying that employment was at will, 
statement by manager that employee "would never be terminated" as long as he "maintained 
his sales and met his quota each year" and existence of written performance improvement 
plan did not provide employee with "a reasonable basis for concluding that he would be 
terminated only for just cause"); Vollrath v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.. 899 F.2d 533, 535 (6th 
Cir. 1990) (because company had issued disclaimer providing for at-will employment, 
8(... continued) 
manager, "showed that Trembly's expectations were reasonable and consistent with objective 
reality within the Company." Brief of Appellant at 22. In fact, Mr. Atnip, like Mr. 
Murphy, testified that MFC was an at-will employer that had the right to terminate "at any 
time for any reason or no reason." Atnip deposition (tab "H") at 48 & 50. Nothing in Mr. 
Murphy's or Mr. Atnip's testimony provides a reasonable basis for the conclusion that 
Trembly was terminable only "for cause" or detracts in any way from the reality that MFC 
employed Trembly at will. See Palmer v. Women's Christian Ass'n. 7 IER Cases 313, 315-
16 (Iowa App. 1982) (in light of disclaimer in employee handbook, employer's practice or 
policy mandating "just cause for dismissal" did not evidence an actionable, contractual term 
of the employment relationship). 
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"would continue in employment as long as he continued to do his job"); De Hornev v. Bank 
of America Nat. Trust and Sav.. 879 F.2d 459, 466 (9th Cii 1989) (employee c< >uld n t 
have reasonably relied upon personnel policies promising "all employees fair treatment" in 
light of express acknowledgement of at-will status);9 Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty 
Advisors. 152 (" ai. App. 3d 467, 482 (Cal. App. 1984) (employee "could not have 
reasonably relied on any implied promise . . . which contradicted" the at-will provision 
contain* t).10 
9Courts have had little trouble in rejecting such indefinite concepts as "fairness" as 
objective manifestations of an employer's intent to create an implied "for-cause" employment 
contract upon which an employee could reasonably rely. See, e.g., Fleming v. AT & T 
Information Services. Inc.. 878 F.2d 1472, 1474 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (statement in employer's 
documents promising "fair and consistent treatment" deemed irrelevant); Ellis v. El Paso 
Natural Gas Co.. 754 F.2d 884, 886 (10th Cir. 1985) (statement in employer's personnel 
manual promising that "the company 'will sever the employment relationship in a fair and 
consistent manner' and 'will establish a fair and consistent method' to resolve employee 
disputes relating to employment'" too indefinite to form an implied contract). 
10The decision in Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co.. 685 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1984), upon 
which Trembly relies, fails to support his position. There, an employee sued for wrongful 
termination claiming, among other things, that language in the employer's policy manual 
"that terminations 'will be processed in a manner which will at all times be fair, reasonable 
and just'" created an implied contract limiting the employer's right to terminate "for cause". 
The Washington Supreme Court disagreed: 
The St. Regis Policy and Procedural Guide states that terminations will be 
handled in a fair, just and equitable manner and, thus, merely implements a 
company policy to treat employees in a fair and consistent manner. Our 
examination of the Policy and Procedural Guide and the entire record shows 
no evidence of an implied contract that appellant was to be discharged only 
for cause. The appellant only had a subjective understanding that he would 
be discharged only for cause which is insufficient to establish an implied 
contract to that effect. 
(continued...) 
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Second, at a minimum, no reasonable jury could conclude that Trembly reasonably 
believed that any implied "for-cause" employment contract continued in force following the 
issuance of the Employee Handbook. To this end, to the extent that written or oral 
representations form an implied "for-cause" term of an employment contract, it is a term of a 
unilateral contract. See Johnson, 818 P.2d at 1002; Brehany, 812 P.2d at 56. As a result, 
an employer may unilaterally amend or abolish that term. Id.; Pratt v. Brown Mach. Co., 
855 F.2d 1225, 1235 (6th Cir. 1988). 
The facts in this case establish: (A) that MFC issued its Employee Handbook in 
November of 1989, (B) that Trembly understood that the Employee Handbook was in effect 
as of that date, (C) that Trembly was familiar with the Employee Handbook and used it in 
training a store manager, (D) that the Employee Handbook superseded "all prior handbooks, 
manuals, policies and procedures issued" by the company and (E) that the Employee 
Handbook clearly, conspicuously and repeatedly insists that all employment with MFC is at 
will. See Fact 1 4; R. at 145-150, 170 & 178-84. The facts in this case also establish that 
all of the conduct that Trembly alleges gives rise to an implied "for-cause" employment 
contract (including the alleged statements made by Mr. Dorin, Cindy Reisner and Randy 
10(... continued) 
Id. at 1085. Put differently, the Thompson court specifically held that promises of fair 
treatment set forth in the employer's policy manual were "no evidence" of an implied-in-fact 
employment contract limiting the employer's right to discharge to only "for cause", the very 
claim Trembly is pressing before this court. Moreover, the Thompson court also held that a 
disclaimer can preclude such statements from being interpreted as modifications of the at-will 
relationship, even where the statements involve specific promises of specific treatment. Id. 
at 1088. In this case, MFC, through its Application for Employment, Policy and Procedures 
Manual and Employee Handbook, provided Trembly with a baker's dozen worth of clear and 
conspicuous disclaimers. See Fact W 2-4. 
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Fields, as well as those contained in Mr IVIiri .mil Procedure Muniu! IMIM ih." vi«len What 
We Stand For) precede the issuance of the Employee Handbook. See R. at 150, 170 & 223; 
Trembly deposition (tab "F") at 16, 26, 153 & 312-13. 
MFC exercised its right to unilaterally amend its employment relationship with 
Trembly to eliminate any implied "for-cause" provision. Consequently, Trembly's claim for 
breach of that provision cannot stand as a matter of law for whatever reasonable expectations 
Trembly "may have harbored , , became unreasonable" when MFC circulated its Employee 
I lai ldbook definitively expressing its at-w ill pc licy. Pratt, 855 I • 2d at 1.235 (circulation of 
handbook including at-will disclaimer precluded employee from reasonably relying upon 
earlier statement made to him by manager that he would not be fn ed "without just cause"); 
see also Butler v. Portland General Electric, 54 FEP Cases 357, 365 (Or. 1990) (employer's 
distribution of handbook with at-will disclaimer eliminated any just cause requirement arising 
out of prior statements made to employee by various managers and statements contained in 
previous handbook). 
CONCLUSION 
As a matter of law, Trembly cannot rebut the presumption of at-will employment. 
Therefore, MFC respectfully requests that this court affirm the order of the trial court 
granting MFC summary judgment on Trembly's claim for breach of an implied "for-cause" 
employment contract. 
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ness. Upon objection of a party to any of the 
items thus submitted or upon a showing that the 
form of statement is insufficient, the master may 
require a different form of statement to be fur-
nished, or the accounts or specific items thereof 
to be proved by oral examination of the account-
ing parties or upon written interrogatories or in 
such other manner as he directs. 
(e) Report 
(1) Contents and filing. The master shall 
prepare a report upon the matters submitted to 
him by the order of reference and, if required to 
make findings of fact and conclusions of law, he 
shall set them forth in the report. He shall file 
the report with the clerk of the court and in an 
action to be tried without a jury, unless other-
wise directed by the order of reference, shall file 
with it a transcript of the proceedings and of the 
evidence and the original exhibits. The clerk 
shall forthwith mail to all parties notice of the 
filing. 
(2) In non-jury actions. In an action to be 
tried without a jury the court shall accept the 
master's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. 
Within 10 days after being served with notice of 
the filing of the report any party may serve writ-
ten objections thereto upon the other parties. Ap-
plication to the court for action upon the report 
and upon objections thereto shall be by motion 
and upon notice as prescribed in Rule 6(d). The 
court after hearing may adopt the report or may 
modify it or may reject it in whole or in part or 
may receive further evidence or may recommit it 
with instructions. 
(3) In jury actions. In an action to be tried by 
a jury the master shall not be directed to report 
the evidence. His findings upon the issues sub-
mitted to him are admissible as evidence of the 
matters found and may be read to the jury, sub-
ject to the ruling of the court upon any objections 
in point of law which may be made to the report. 
(4) Stipulation as to findings. The effect of a 
master's report is the same whether or not the 
parties have consented to the reference; but, 
when the parties stipulate that a master's find-
ings of fact shall be final, only questions of law 
arising upon the report shall thereafter be con-
sidered. 
(5) Draft report. Before filing his report a 
master may submit a draft thereof to counsel for 
all parties for the purpose of receiving their sug-
gestions. 
(0 Objections to appointment of master. A 
party may object to the appointment of any person as 
a master on the same grounds as a party may chal-
lenge for cause any prospective trial juror in the trial 
of a civil action. Such objections must be heard and 
disposed of by the court in the same manner as a 
motion. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
PART VTL 
JUDGMENT. 
Rule 54. Judgments; coats. 
la) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these 
rules includes a decree and any order from which an 
appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a recital of 
pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of 
prior proceedings. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or in-
volving multiple parties. When more than one 
claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party 
claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, the 
court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to 
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties 
only upon an express determination by the court that 
there is no just reason for delay and upon an express 
direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of 
such determination and direction, any order or other 
form of decision, however designated, which .Jjudi-
cates fewer than all the claims or the nghts and lia-
bilities of fewer than all the parties shall not termi-
nate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and 
the order or other form of decision is subject to revi-
sion at any time before the entry of judgment adjudi-
cating all the claims and the nghts and liabilities of 
all the parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment 
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against 
whom a judgment is entered by default, every 
final judgment shall grant the relief to which the 
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, 
even if the party has not demanded such relief in 
his pleadings. It may be given for or against one 
or more of several claimants; and it may, when 
the justice of the case requires it, determine the 
ultimate rights of the parties on each side as be-
tween or among themselves. 
(2) Judgment by default A judgment by de-
fault shall not be different in kind from, or ex-
ceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in 
the demand for judgment. 
(d) Costs. 
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express 
provision therefor is made either in a statute of 
this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed 
as of course to the prevailing party unless the 
court otherwise directs; provided, however, 
where an appeal or other proceeding for review is 
taken, costs of the action, other than costs in con-
nection with such appeal or other proceeding for 
review, shall abide the final determination of the 
cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers 
and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent 
permitted by law. 
(2) How aaaessed. The party who claims his 
costs must within five days after the entry of 
judgment serve upon the adverse party against 
whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memoran-
dum of the items of his costs and necessary dis-
bursements in the action, and file with the court 
a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating 
that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct, 
and that the disbursements have been necessar-
ily incurred in the action or proceeding. A party 
dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within 
seven days after service of the memorandum of 
costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed 
by the court in which the judgment was ren-
dered. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after 
the verdict or at the time of or subsequent to the 
service and filing of the findings of fact and con-
clusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, 
shall nevertheless be considered as served and 
filed on the date judgment is entered. 
(3), (4) [Deleted.] 
(e) Interest and coats to be included in the 
judgment The clerk must include in any judgment 
signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision 
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from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the 
same have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk must, 
within two days after the costs have been taxed or 
ascertained, in any case where not included m the 
judgment, insert the amount thereof in a blank left in 
the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar 
notation thereof in the register of actions and in the 
judgment docket. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1985.) 
Rule 55. Default 
ia) Default 
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a judg-
ment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to 
plead or otherwise defend as provided by these 
rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk 
shall enter his default. 
(2) Notice to party in default After the 
entry of the default of any party, as provided in 
Subdivision ia)< 1) of this rule, it shall not be nec-
essary to give such party in default any notice of 
action taken or to be taken or to serve any notice 
or paper otherwise required by these rules to be 
served on a party to the action or proceeding, 
except as provided in Rule 5(a), m Rule 58Aid) or 
in the event that it is necessary for the court to 
conduct a hearing with regard to the amount of 
damages of the nondefaulting party. 
(b) Judgment Judgment by default may be en-
tered as follows: 
(1) By the clerk. When the plaintiffs claim 
against a defendant is for a sum certain or for a 
sum which can by computation be made certain, 
and the defendant has been personally served 
otherwise than by publication or by personal ser-
vice outside of this state, the clerk upon request 
of the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the 
amount due and costs against the defendant, if 
he has been defaulted for failure to appear and if 
he is not an infant or incompetent person. 
(2) By the cour t In all other cases the party 
entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to 
the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court 
to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is 
necessary to take an account or to determine the 
amount of damages or to establish the truth of 
any averment by evidence or to make an investi-
gation of any other matter, the court may con-
duct such hearings or order such references as it 
deems necessary and proper. 
(c) Setting aside default For good cause shown 
the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a 
judgment by default has been entered, may likewise 
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b). 
<d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimanta, croea-cUim-
ants. The provisions of this rule apply whether the 
party entitled to the judgment by default is a plain-
tiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded 
a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all cases a judgment 
by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c). 
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or 
agency thereof. No judgment by default shall be en-
tered against the state of Utah or against an officer or 
agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his 
claim or nght to relief by evidence satisfactory to the 
court 
(Amended effective Sept 4, 1986.) 
Rule 56. Summary judgment 
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon 
a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a 
declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expi-
ration of 20 days from the commencement of the ac-
tion or after service of a motion for summary judg. 
ment by the adverse party, move with or without sup. 
porting affidavits for a summary judgment in his fa-
vor upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a 
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a 
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a sum-
mary judgment in his favor as to all or any part 
thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The mo-
tion shall be served at least 10 days before the time 
fixed for the hearing. The adverse party pnor to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the 
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine 
issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on 
motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon 
the whole case or for all the relief asked and a tnal is 
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by 
examining the pleadings and the evidence before it 
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable as-
certain what material facts exist without substantial 
controversy and what material facts are actually and 
in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make 
an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which 
the amount of damages or other relief is not in contro-
versy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the tnal of the action the 
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the 
trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; de-
fense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits 
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and 
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent 
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or cer-
tified copies of ail papers or parts thereof referred to 
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be sup-
plemented or opposed by depositions, answers to in-
terrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for 
summary judgment is made and supported as pro-
vided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but 
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in 
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be 
entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it 
appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the 
motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the 
court may refuse the application for judgment or may 
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be ob-
tained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be 
had or may make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it ap-
pear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that 
any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of 
delay, the court shall forthwith order the party em-
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ploying them to pay to the other party the amount of 
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affida-
vits caused him to incur, including reasonable attor-
ney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may 
bs adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Rule 57. Declaratory judgments. 
The procedure for obtaining a declaratory judg-
ment pursuant to Chapter 33 of Title 78, U.C.A. 1953, 
shall be in accordance with these rules, and the right 
to trial by jury may be demanded under the circum-
stances and in the manner provided in Rules 38 and 
39. The existence of another adequate remedy does 
not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases 
where it is appropriate. The court may order a speedy 
hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment and 
may advance it on the calendar. 
Rule 58A. Entry. 
i a) Judgment upon the verdict of a jury. Unless 
the court otherwise directs and subject to the provi-
sions of Rule 54(b), judgment upon the verdict of a 
jury shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed. 
If there is a special verdict or a general verdict ac-
companied by answers to interrogatories returned by 
a jury pursuant to Rule 49, the court shall direct the 
appropriate judgment which shall be forthwith 
signed by the clerk and filed. 
(b) Judgment in other cases. Except as provided 
in Subdivision (a) hereof and Subdivision (b)(1) of 
Rule 55, all judgments shall be signed by the judge 
and filed with the clerk. 
(c) When judgment entered; notation in regis-
ter of actions and judgment docket. A judgment is 
complete and shall be deemed entered for all pur-
poses, except the creation of a lien on real property, 
when the same is signed and filed as herein above 
provided. The clerk shall immediately make a nota-
tion of the judgment in the register of actions and the 
judgment docket. 
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment The 
prevailing party shall promptly give notice of the 
signing or entry of judgment to all other parties and 
shall file proof of service of such notice with the clerk 
of the court. However, the time for filing a notice of 
appeal is not affected by the notice requirement of 
this provision. 
(e) Judgment alter death of a party. If a party 
dies after a verdict or decision upon any issue of fact 
and before judgment, judgment may nevertheless be 
rendered thereon. 
(f) Judgment by confession. Whenever a judg-
ment by confession is authorized by statute, the party 
seeking the same must file with the clerk of the court 
in which the judgment is to be entered a statement, 
verified by the defendant, to the following effect: 
(1) If the judgment to be confessed is for money 
due or to become due, it shall concisely state the 
claim and that the sum confessed therefor is 
justly due or to become due; 
(2) If the judgment to be confessed is for the 
purpose of securing the plaintiff against a contin-
gent liability, it must state concisely the claim 
and that the sum confessed therefor does not ex-
ceed the same; 
(3) It must authorize the entry of judgment for 
a specified sum. 
The clerk shall thereupon endorse upon the state-
ment, and enter in the judgment docket, a judgment 
of the court for the amount confessed, with costs of 
entry, if any. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; Jan. I, 1987.) 
Rule 58B. Satisfaction of judgment 
(a) Satisfaction by owner or attorney. A judg-
ment may be satisfied, in whole or in part, as to any 
or all of the judgment debtors, by the owner thereof, 
or by the attorney of record of the judgment creditor 
where no assignment of the judgment has been filed 
and such attorney executes such satisfaction within 
eight years after the entry of the judgment, in the 
following manner: (1) by written instrument, duly ac-
knowledged by such owner or attorney; or (2) by ac-
knowledgment of such satisfaction signed by the 
owner or attorney and entered on the docket of the 
judgment in the county where first docketed, with the 
date affixed and witnessed by the clerk. Every satis-
faction of a part of the judgment, or as to one or more 
of the judgment debtors, shall state the amount paid 
thereon or for the release of such debtors, naming 
them. 
(b) Satisfaction by order of court. When a judg-
ment shall have been fully paid and not satisfied of 
record, or when the satisfaction of judgment shall 
have been lost, the court in which such judgment was 
recovered may, upon motion and satisfactory proof, 
authorize the attorney of the judgment creditor to 
satisfy the same, or may enter an order declaring the 
same satisfied and direct satisfaction to be entered 
upon the docket. 
(c) Entry by clerk. Upon receipt of a satisfaction 
of judgment, duly executed and acknowledged, the 
clerk shall file the same with the papers in the case, 
and enter it on the register of actions. He shall also 
enter a brief statement of the substance thereof, in-
cluding th* amount paid, on the margin of the judg-
ment docket, with the date of filing of such satisfac-
tion. 
(d) Effect of satisfaction. When a judgment shall 
have been satisfied, in whole or in part, or as to any 
judgment debtor, and such satisfaction entered upon 
the docket by the clerk, such judgment shall, to the 
extent of such satisfaction, be discharged and cease to 
be a lien. In case of partial satisfaction, if any execu-
tion shall thereafter be issued on the judgment, such 
execution shall be endorsed with a memorandum of 
such partial satisfaction and shall direct the officer to 
collect only the residue thereof, or to collect only from 
the judgment debtors remaining liable thereon. 
(e) Filing transcript of satisfaction in other 
counties. When any satisfaction of a judgment shall 
have been entered on the judgment docket of the 
county where such judgment was first docketed, a 
certified transcript of satisfaction, or a certificate by 
the clerk showing such satisfaction, may be filed with 
the clerk of the district court in any other county 
where the judgment may have been docketed. There-
upon a similar entry in the judgment docket shalf be 
made by the clerk of such court; and such entry shall 
have the sajne effect as in the county where the same 
was originally entered. 
Rule 58. New trials; amendments of judgment 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, 
a new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties 
and on all or part of the issues, for any of the follow-
ing causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a 
new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court 
may open the judgment if one has been entered, take 
additional testimony, amend findings of fact and con-
clusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, 
and direct the entry of a new judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, 
jury or adverse party, or any order of the court, or 
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abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair tnal 
(2) Misconduct of the jury, and whenever any 
one or more of the jurors have been induced to 
assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the 
court, by resort to a determination by chance or 
as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors 
i3» Accident or surprise, which ordinary pru-
dence could not have guarded against 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for 
the party making the application, which he could 
not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appear-
mg to have been given under the influence of 
passion or prejudice 
<6> Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the 
verdict or other decision, or that it is against law 
(7) Error in law 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new tnal 
shall be served not later than 10 days after the entry 
of the judgment 
\o Affidavit*; time for filing. When the applica-
tion for a new trial is made under Subdivision (a)(1), 
(2). (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit 
Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affi-
davit*, they shall be served with the motion The op-
posing party has 10 days after such service within 
which to serve opposing affidavits The time within 
which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be 
served may be extended for an additional period not 
exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause 
shown or by the parties by written stipulation The 
court may permit reply affidavits 
(d) On initiative of cour t Not later than 10 days 
after entry of judgment the court of its own initiative 
may order a new tnal for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, 
and in the order shall specify the grounds therefor 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A mo-
tion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served 
not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judg-
ments, orders or other parts of the record and errors 
therein arising from oversight or omission may be 
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative 
or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if 
any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an 
appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the 
appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereaf-
ter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected 
with leave of the appellate court 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; 
newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion 
and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal rep-
resentative from a final judgment, order, or proceed-
ing for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadver-
tence, surprise, or excusable neglect, (2) newly discov-
ered evidence which by due diligence could not have 
been discovered in tune to move for a new trial under 
Rule 59(b), (3) fraud (whether heretofore denomi-
nated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or 
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for 
any cause, the summons in an action has not been 
personally served upon the defendant as required by 
Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in 
said action, (5) the judgment is void, (6) the judgment 
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application, or 
(7) any other reason justifying relief from the opera-
tion of the judgment The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons 11). (2), (3) 
or (4), not more than 3 months after the judgment 
order, or proceeding was entered or taken A motion 
under this Subdivision ib) does not affect the finality 
of a judgment or suspend its operation This rule does 
not limit the power of a court to entertain an indepen-
dent action to relieve a party from a judgment order 
or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud 
upon the court The procedure for obtaining any relief 
from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in 
these rules or by an independent action 
Rule 61. Harmless error. 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of 
evidence, and no error or defect m any ruling or order 
or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any 
of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or 
otherwise disturbing a judgment or order unless re-
fusal to take such action appears to the court incon-
sistent with substantial justice The court at every 
stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or 
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the sub-
stantial rights of the parties 
Rule 62. Stay of proceedings to enforce a judg-
ment 
(a) Stay upon entry of judgment Execution or 
other proceedings to enforce a judgment may issue 
immediately upon the entry of the judgment unless 
the court in its discretion and on such conditions for 
the security of the adverse party as are proper other-
wise directs 
(b) Stay on motion for new trial or for judg-
ment In its discretion and on such conditions for the 
security of the adverse party as are proper, the court 
may stay the execution of, or any proceedings to en-
force, a judgment pending the disposition of a motion 
for a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment made 
pursuant to Rule 59, or of a motion for relief from a 
judgment or order made pursuant to Rule 60, or of a 
motion for judgment in accordance with a motion for 
a directed verdict made pursuant to Rule 50, or of a 
motion for amendment to the findings or for addi-
tional findings made pursuant to Rule 52(b) 
(c) Injunction pending appeal. When an appeal 
is taken from an interlocutory or final judgment 
granting, dissolving, or denying an injunction, the 
court in its discretion may suspend, modify, restore, 
or grant an injunction during the pendency of the 
appeal upon such conditions as it considers proper for 
the security of the rights of the adverse party 
(d) Stay upon appeal When an appeal is taken 
the appellant by giving a supersedeas bond may ob-
tain a stay, unless such a stay is otherwise prohibited 
by law or these rules The bond may be given at or 
after the time of filing the notice of appeal. The stay 
is effective when the supersedeas bond is approved by 
the court. 
(e) Stay in favor of the state, or agency thereof. 
When an appeal is taken by the United States, the 
state of Utah, or an officer or agency of either, or by 
direction of any department of either, and the opera-
tion or enforcement of the judgment is stayed, no 
bond, obligation, or other security shall be required 
from the appellant. 
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Randall N. Skanchy (USB #2968) 
Deno G. Himonas (USB #5483) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOE D. TREMBLY, 
: ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
Plaintiff, : FOR RELIEF FROM ORDER 
vs. : 
MRS. FIELDS COOKIES, : Civil No. 10756 
Defendant. : 
Defendant's Motion for Relief for Order came on for argument on April 15, 1993. 
The Plaintiff was represented by Russell C. Fericks of Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson. 
The Defendant was represented by Randall N. Skanchy and Deno G. Himonas of Jones, 
Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough. The Court, having heard the arguments of counsel and 
having reviewed the pleadings on file and the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in 
Sanderson v. First Security Leasing. 844 P.2d 303 (Dec. 8, 1992), and in Hodgson v. Bunzl 
Utah. Inc.. 844 P.2d 331 (Dec. 23, 1992), is of the opinion that the undisputed facts 
establish as a matter of law that Plaintiffs employment relationship with Defendant was "at-
will". 
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THEREFORE, THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES 
that Defendant's Motion for Relief from Order is granted; 
FURTHER ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES that the Court's prior ruling 
denying Defendant summary judgment on plaintiffs claim for breach of an alleged implied-
in-fact employment contract to be terminated only "for cause" (Count I) is vacated; 
FURTHER ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES that Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is granted in its entirety; and 
FINALLY ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES that Defendant's 
counterclaims be dismissed without prejudice. 
DATED this 7> day of May, 1993. 
IE COURT 
David S. Youn 
District Court /Judge 
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RUSSELL C. FERICKS [A3793] 
NATHAN R. HYDE [A5489] 
GERALD J. LALLATIN [A5986] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-1777 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOE D. TREMBLY 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MRS. FIELDS COOKIES 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 10756 
Plaintiff Joe D. Trembly, by and through his counsel of 
record, hereby gives notice pursuant to Rule 3, Utah R. App. P. 
that he appeals to the Supreme Court of Utah the "Order on 
Defendant's Motion for Relief from Order" entered by this District 
Court of the Third Judicial District in and for Summit County, 
State of Utah on May 25, 1993 by the Honorable David S. Young• 
Dated this 23rd day of June, 1993. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
RUSSELL C\ RHgZCKS 
UATHAN R. HTOE 
GERALD J. LALLATIN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Nd 
F I L E D ' 
JUN 2 4 1993 
Clerk of Summit County / _ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument, having been executed and entered by ^ the . 
Court, has been mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this -??-> 
day of -3t/sf*--- , 1993, to the following: 
Randall N. Skanchy, Esq, 
Deno Himonas, Esq. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
^tf&/k^1<*/0'\ ^^rl~U <^_ 
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APPLICATION FOR EMPLOYMENT "iliiiKffl'i: 
». •„..,„• „,,„,„„ ,*Jta ±Z£^£ZZZ£j'l£r~ " c°mpmy 
Date: 
Name: 
PERSONAL INFORMATION 
Social Security No. si :> 
Present Address: i l m Middto 
^fc ^ < T ^ > : r>«> 
StM* City Sip 
Permanent Address: 
Stmt 
Phone Number 7~)^ -~^ / 1 <~ 
r / 
Ctty 
Referred By: / ,>n Car- _ , .JU . j - ^ 
•fr—dy wnulunJ by < 
Position: S 4 ^ 1 -
EMPLOYMENT DESIRED 
Date you can start 
Salary Desired: V"rV Are you currently employed?: Yes Y__ No 
Have you ever applied to this company before? Yes No J^ When 
Name and Location 
EDUCATION 
Last Year 
Completed 
Did you Subjects Studied 
Graduate? Defree(s) Received 
Grammar School 
High School 
College 
Trade, Business 
or Correspondence 
* **+ 
• * * " • * • * -
Cf 
' ' < ? 
2^i J 
' 1 
1 ^ 
No 
^ 
Yea 
Yea , £ 
Subjects of Special Study or R h Work: 
' — - ' • - - r ^ ^ 
What Foreita Laa|uat« Do You Speak, wriie or RMd Fiimtfy? 
Activities Other Than Religious (Civic. Athletic. Etc.) 
FORMER EMPLOYERS 
Please list former empl°y**s% ^finnint wittl tfle ™ost current. Attach additional sheets if necessary. 
Month and Year N t m « ind Address of Employer Salary 
Reason 
Position For Leaving 
to* 
hoc -' 
Ul 
:o 
, x / t . 
REFERENCES 
Give the Names of Three Persons Not Related to You, Whom You Have Known At Least One Year 
Name Addre^ Phone Business Years Known 
- / - / •/ fv 
'"" -X-V -J.*- itt 
PHYSICAL RECORD 
Do you have any physical condition which may limit your ability to perform the job applied for? If 
so, please indicate how the Company may accommodate any physical limitation. 
. u 
la Case of Emergency Notify: 
- k ^ " fc?*?./*^^* / > %/<^r 
No. 
•*" 
I authorize investigation of afl statements contained in this application. I understand that mis-
representation or omission of facts called for is cause for *«•»—>—i Further, I understand and agree 
that my employment is for no definite period and may, refardless of the date of payment of my wages 
and salary* be terminated at any time without any previous notice. 
L* "?C 
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RUSSELL C. FERICKS [A3793] 
NATHAN R. HYDE [A5489] 
GERALD J. LALLATIN [A5986] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
JCey Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-1777 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOE D. TREMBLY 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
MRS. FIELDS COOKIES 
CORPORATION, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
APPELLANT'S 
DOCKETING STATEMENT 
(May be assigned to Court of 
Appeals) 
Case No. 930290 
Appellant Joe D. Trembly ("Trembly"), by and through her 
counsel of record and pursuant to Rule 9, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, submits the following Docketing Statement. 
1. JURISDICTION: The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
of Utah is conferred by U.C.A. § 78-2-2(3)(j) 1992. 
2. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: This is an appeal from a 
summary judgment in the Third Judicial District Court of Summit 
County, State of Utah, Judge David S. Young presiding. 
3. DATE OF JUDGMENT: The "Order on Defendant's Motion 
for Relief From Order" which is the subject of this appeal was 
entered by the Trial Court on May 25, 1993 and resulted in 
dismissal of all of Trembly's claims and causes of action. 
4. DATE OF NOTICE OF APPEAL: Notice of Appeal was 
filed with the Third Judicial District Court of Summit County on 
June 24, 1993, and with the Utah Supreme Court on June 25, 1993. 
5. STATEMENT OF FACTS: Plaintiff and Appellant Trembly 
was hired by Defendant and Appellee Mrs. Fields Cookies ("MFC") on 
November 26, 1986 and was subsequently promoted to a number of 
responsible positions in the organization. After having been off 
work because of an extended illness, Trembly was placed in a 
temporary assignment in 1990, and then was terminated. Trembly 
brought an action against MFC in the Third Judicial District Court 
for Summit County, State of Utah alleging that he had been 
improperly terminated in violation of an implied-in-fact agreement 
that he would only be terminated for cause. 
In various pleadings, Trembly alleged that statements in 
the company documents and explicit statements and actions by 
company executives created an implied-in-fact agreement that he 
would not be terminated without cause. 
On November 27, 1991, a hearing was held in the Third 
Judicial District, Judge Homer Wilkinson presiding, on MFC's Motion 
for Summary Judgement in which it asked for dismissal of all causes 
of action. Judge Wilkinson dismissed some of Trembly's causes of 
action but denied the motion to dismiss the claims of an implied-
in-fact contract. 
Before an order was entered, MFC filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration of the court's denial of its requested summary 
2 
judgment. In March 1992, Judge Wilkinson, having considered the 
Motion for Reconsideration, entered an order leaving the implied-
in-fact contact claim intact. 
On February 25, 1993, MFC filed a Motion for Relief From 
Order asking the Third District Court to again reconsider the 
court's Judge Wilkinson's denial of MFC Motion For Summary 
Judgment on Trembly's claim of an alleged implied-in-fact 
employment contract. MFC cited the publication of two cases 
decided by the Utah Supreme Court as the basis for reconsideration. 
Trembly objected to the motion both on the merits and on the 
propriety of a district court judge overruling the "law of the 
case" as established by another district court judge. 
On April 25, 1993, Judge Young entered an order vacating 
Judge Wilkinson's March 1993 order, thereby granting MFC's Motion 
For Summary Judgment for dismissal of the implied-in-fact contract 
claims, stating that "the undisputed facts establish as a matter of 
law" that Trembly's employment was at-will.. 
6. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL: 
a. Was summary dismissal of Trembly's claims in 
error because disputed issues of material facts, when considered in 
a light most favorable to Trembly, establish an implied-in-fact 
employment relationship terminable for cause only. 
b. Was the District Court in error in allowing 
MFC's motion to be heard since no new facts were presented and such 
a motion is contrary to the "law of the case" doctrine, and because 
a District Court judge may not vacate the prior decision of another 
3 
District Court judge. 
Standard of Review; All issues are challenges to 
conclusions of law and are therefore reviewable without according 
deference to the Trial Court's conclusions of law, and viewing the 
facts in the light most favorable to Appellants. Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield v. State. 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989). 
7. CITATIONS: 
Thurston v. Box Elder County. 835 P.2d 165 (Utah 1992). 
Heslop v. Bank of Utah. 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992). 
Sanderson v. First Security Leasing. 844 P.2d 303 (Utah 1992). 
Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah. Inc.. 844 P.2d 331 (Utah 1992). 
Berube v. Fashion Ctr. Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989). 
Johnson v. Morton Thiokol. Inc.. 818 P.2d 997 (Utah 1991). 
Harward v. Harward. 526 P.2d 1183 (Utah 1974) 
Peav v. Peav. 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980) 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Contractors. Inc.. 761 P.2d 42 (Utah 
App. 1988) . 
8. PRIOR APPEALS: There have been no prior appeals in 
this case. 
DATED this 101'K day of July, 1993. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
«/< 
yfcUSSELL-J^ " FERICKS 
•NATHAN R. HYDE 
GERALD J. LALLATIN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument, having been executed and entered by the 
Court, ha^ /be/en mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this ' C^^-
day of ^A/y^ , 1993, to the following: 
^ Randall N. Skanchy, Esq. 
Deno G. Himonas, Esq. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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Q You became a store manager in April of 1987. Which 
store did you manage? 
A The Florida Mall in Orlando. 
Q Did Bill move on to some additional store someplace 
else? 
A He was terminated• 
Q Okay. Do you know what the reason for the 
termination was? 
A Failure to lock the safe in the store. 
Q Did you participate at all in the discussions 
concerning his termination? 
A What do you mean by that? 
Q Were you advised by Fields1 representatives before 
the termination took place to give input about the termination 
of Bill? 
A I was advised that he was on discipline prior 
because of the safe. The day that he was to be fired — well# 
the day he was fired I was told that since he failed to lock 
the safe again, it was like the third time or second time, 
that it constituted his termination. 
Q Okay. And you immediately became at that point 
promoted to this store manager of that store? 
A I believe it was a couple days between that time. I 
was still a manager or still an assistant manager and I was 
just — I needed to take the tests and things to become a 
26 
I had been learning all of the duties of a manager. When this 
manager got terminated, Nabil Dijani# I was more left to 
battle on my own. Through telephone conversations, you know, 
with my district manager I would ask questions on how do I do 
this or how do I do that. Okay? I had taken the tests, but 
there were still questions, you know, that were not 
answerable, you know, in the documentation that was given to 
me. So the training was basically done on the phone until she 
came to visit me to do on-the-job training. 
Q Okay. How long were you at the Bloomingdale's 
store? 
A From May or June, whatever it would have been, the 
end of May, first of June, until it was in late August of that 
same year. 
Q Where did you go? 
A I got promoted. 
Q And what was your promotion? 
A To a district sales manager. 
Q Did you have to go through any certification or 
testing process before the promotion? 
A No, I did not. 
Q And who promoted you? 
A Mitchell Dor in, D-o-r-i-n. 
Q Okay. How did your responsibilities as a district 
sales manager change? 
153 
1 A Yes. 
2 Q Okay. You filed in your Complaint a claim for 
3 misrepresentation to Fields1 employees indicated to you 
4 certain things about the job which caused you to leave Disney 
5 and come to Mrs. Fields. Who was it that made representations 
6 to you? 
7 A Mitchell Dor in. 
8 Q What did Mr. Dorin say? Well, excuse me. When did 
9 this take place in terms of — 
10 A This would have taken place maybe in February, 
11 March. I don't, you know, I don't have an exact time frame 
12 for t h a t . 
13 Q Okay. February-March of '87. What did Mr. Dor in 
14 say? 
15 A That he was going to be promoted, he was working to 
16 become a regional director, and that he wanted to keep me on 
17 so that I could be in his — you know, on his team as a 
18 district manager in Florida. 
19 Q Okay. Anything else that he said to you? 
20 A Other than that I would be — you know, I would have 
21 a chance for, you know, for upward movement. 
22 I Q He didn't guarantee you upward movement, though, did 
23 he? 
24 A Yes, he did. 
25 Q Oh, he did? 
312 
1 Q All right. When you have an occasion to terminate 
2 an individual, did you refer to some manual? 
3 A Usually the discipline section of the training 
4 manual. It's usually listed in there, procedures for 
5 discipline. It's always under discipline. It's never under 
6 termination. 
7 Q And so when you do that, instead of reviewing the 
8 policies and procedures manual, you'd look at a training 
9 manual? 
10 A To look — you know, I knew the policy, so I didn't 
11 have to look to anything. You know, I knew what the stages of 
12 discipline were that resulted in termination. That was the 
13 discipline policy. I knew that very well. I didn't have to 
14 refer to a manual that Randy claims was no good. So I didn't 
15 do that. 
16 Q Let's get to that conversation. When did you have 
17 this conversation with Randy? 
18 A Well, Randy made conversations about the manuals in 
19 his — 
20 Q I want the conversation that you had with Randy. 
21 A Well, it's not a conversation that I would have. 
22 It's a video that he gave me to look at. Now, that is a 
23 conversation that he wanted me to see that he had. I saw that 
24 conversation. In addition — 
25 Q When was this? 
313 
1 A It would have been sometime, I'm sure, when I was — 
2 early when I was a district manager. I received copies of 
3 videos of Randy and his conversations, 
4 Q Do you have a copy of that video in your possession? 
5 A No, I do not. 
6 Q Okay. Do you know what that video was entitled? 
7 Did it have a title or a name? 
8 A Yes, "Good Enough Never Is." 
9 Q Okay. 
10 A "What We Stand For" I think may have been another 
11 one that had that. 
12 Q Which one was it that had this discussion? 
13 A They both may have had it, something that they 
14 stressed very often. So — 
15 Q I take it you don't know which one had it? 
16 A I would be better to say probably "What We Stand 
17 For" better would have that in there. 
18 Q Okay. 
19 A In addition to his conversation in Park City, Utah, 
20 when we talked about terminations. 
21 Q Okay. Now let's deal with the video first. You 
22 don't recall when you saw it? 
23 A I've seen it probably 20, 30, 40 times. Be 
24 difficult to say when. 
25 Q When was the last time you saw this video? 
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Q. Okay. Mr. Murphy, what do you understand the 
term "at will" to mean? 
A. It means that the company reserves the right to 
terminate a person at any time, with or without cause. And 
also, the employee can terminate employment with or without 
notice. 
Q. Is that concept demonstrated in Exhibits Four 
and Two of the Tirado deposition? 
A. Excuse me. 
Q. Is the at will concept reflected in what has 
been previously marked as deposition Exhibit Two of the 
Tirado deposition? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And is it reflected in what has previously been 
marked as deposition Exhibit Four in the Tirado deposition? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is the concept of at will employment, to your 
mind, that's reflected in these documents, inconsistent with 
the statement, on what was previously marked as deposition 
Exhibit 24 in the Power deposition, of quality products? 
A. At will employment is not contradictory with 
quality products. 
Q. Is it inconsistent with the notion of quality 
customer service? 
A. No. 
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I will leave it at that for now. 
Q. (By Mr. Fericks) Can you terminate somebody for 
the purpose of causing them emotional distress? 
MR. HIMONES: Same objections. 
Q. As an at will employer? 
MR. HIMONES: If you don't understand the question, 
tell him so. 
A. Well, at will employer means, and it states in 
the company's literature, that the company can terminate 
with or without cause. 
Q. Was Mariamercedes Power terminated without 
cause? 
MR. HIMONES: I object to lack of foundation. Go 
ahead. Give him your understanding. 
A. She was not terminated for cause at all. Her 
position was eliminated. 
Q. Isn't economic circumstances cause for 
terminating somebody? 
MR. HIMONES: Asked and answered. 
A. Well, it is true that the economic conditions 
did cause that position to be eliminated and that resulted 
in her leaving the company. 
Q. So that was your cause; right? 
A. I guess that is true. 
Q. So you didn't terminate Mariamercedes Power at 
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Q. That was your cause; right? 
A, It refers to the business, not to her. 
Q. It was your cause; right? 
MR. HIMONES: Go ahead and answer the question. 
A. In my mind, the issue of with or without cause 
relates to the individual. In this particular case, the job 
was eliminated because of the conditions of the business. 
MR. HIMONES: If we answer that was our reason for 
doing it, Russ, if that makes any difference, I don't know. 
If you ask him that, I think it clears up the problem that 
Dan and I have with the question. And I know you don't care 
what my problem is with the question. 
A. We terminated her because the needs of the 
business dictated that the position be eliminated. 
Q. And at will means you can terminate a person 
even if the needs of the business don't dictate it. Right? 
A. That would be without cause. 
Q. Right. And that is at will. Right? 
A. Both are at will. 
Q. But at will allows you to terminate somebody 
without cause. Right? 
A. It allows you to terminate with or without 
cause. 
Power. 
Q. And you had cause to terminate Mariamercedes 
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» 1 
you knew Mrs. Fields was an at-will company, 
, I did. 
— - - • 
I believe you testified earlier that you 
meant that Mrs. Fields could terminate at any 
any reason or no reason? | 
Yes. 
Did 
• i 
you ever terminate or were you ever involved 
in a termination of any employee for theft? 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, 
And 
I was. 
did you put that employee on a stage one 
disciplinary process, Craig? 
MR. 
THE 
BY MR. HIMONAS: 
Q. 
was ever 
one, two 
FERICKS: Objection, relevance. 
WITNESS: No. 
So when you told Mr. Fericks then that anyone that 
terminated by the company had to go through steps 
T three 
was it, Crajjg^ ? 
A. I wc 
and four, that wasn't an accurate statement, 
)uld have to say what you just said is correct. 
It depended on the action by the employee. Again, there were 
certain actions 
Q. 
that required a stage-four termination. 
I see. But what my question was -- it's jiot 
necess^rily_true that you go througlT~each separate stage; that 
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50 
guidelines and procedures for terminating an individual. If 
that meant starting at stage one, it meant starting at stage 
one. If it was an immediate termination, we would go straight 
to stage four which is termination. 
Q. And those grounds for immediate termination that 
you're referring to are set forth in the policy and procedures 
manual we spoke about? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And again that's where your understanding of this 
process comes from, Craig? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You understood that that was a goal that 
Mrs. Fields had? 
A. I understood it was a goal of Mrs. Fields -- I 
don't understand. 
Q. Well, probably because it was a very unartfully 
phrased question. Let me try again. 
^ ifc 1 ttndeystand your testimony correctly you 
understood that fits. Melds was en at-<»ill employer? 
*><? 
cQrx< 
you understood at will to mean you can be 
Imy time for any reason or no reason at all, 
Tee. 
You also understood, however, that Mrs. Fields 
A. 
Q. 
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